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Abstract. We investigate the growth strategies of hedge fund firms.We find that firms with
successful first funds are able to launch follow-on funds that charge higher performance fees,
set more onerous redemption terms, and attract greater inflows. Motivated by the afore-
mentioned spillover effects, first funds outperform follow-on funds, after adjusting for risk.
Consistent with the agency view, greater incentive alignment moderates the performance
differential between first and follow-on funds. Moreover, multiple-product firms under-
perform single-product firms but harvest greater fee revenues, thereby hurting investors
while benefitting firmpartners. Investors respond to this growth strategy by redeeming from
first funds of firms with follow-on funds that do poorly. Empirically, the multiple-product
firm has become the dominant business model for the hedge fund industry.
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The Board’s point of view is that at its essence the Man
Group’s strategy is a growth strategy. . . . And when
we’re looking therefore at each aspect of our business,
we have to be able to grow it. We have to be able to
scale it. —Kevin Hayes, Man Group1
1. Introduction
Hedge funds collectivelymanagedclose toUS$3.15 trillion
in assets in the second quarter of 2019.2 Institutional
investors have grown to become the dominant investor
clientele in this industry.3 Concomitantly, increased reg-
ulatory and compliance costs, as well as a heightened
pressure to lower hedge fund fees, have ratcheted up the
critical mass needed for a hedge fund firm to sustain op-
erations with management fee revenues.4 Therefore, it has
become imperative forhedge fundfirms togrowinorder to
attract large institutional investors and to spread the higher
fixed costs over a larger asset base. Although recent aca-
demic work has emphasized how the incentives of hedge
fundmanagersmotivate asset growth (Lim et al. 2016, Yin
2016), thequestion remains: howdohedge fundfirmsgrow?
Our paper fills this gap by focusing on the behavior
of hedge fund firms who have managed to create a
track record and who now face a choice of growth
strategy. We start with the observation that hedge
fund firms often operate multiple funds, and not all
fundsmanaged by a hedge fundfirm command the same
regard from investors. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
the reputation of a multiple-fund firm rests heavily on
the performance of its first fund.5 Having started herfirst
fund, in order to grow her business, a hedge fund man-
ager faces two choices. She could (i) simply grow the
assets under management (henceforth AUM) of a single
commingled fund or product, or (ii) offer multiple funds
or products. Which of these two options is the preferred
one? Do hedge fund firms leverage off the stellar per-
formance of their first funds to launch additional funds?
Do the capital-raising activities of multiple-product
firms benefit investors? How do such activities impact
the total fee revenue of the hedge fund firm?And howdo
investors respond tofirms that launchmultiple products?
Our results are striking. We find that hedge fund firms
with successful first funds are more likely to launch mul-
tiple follow-on funds. Moreover, the follow-on funds that
they launch charge higher performance fees, setmore oner-
ous redemption terms, and attract greater inflows. These
effects prevail after controlling for the performance of the
other follow-on funds conceived by the same firm. Indeed,
past first fund performance predicts future flows into
follow-on funds over and above the explanatory power of
their respective track records. Further, the intrafirm spill-
over effects from first funds are substantially stronger than
those from the other funds launched by hedge fund firms.
1
In light of the positive spillover effects engendered
by first funds, are managers incentivized to deliver
better performance with the earlier funds launched
by their firms? We find that first funds outperform
follow-on funds by 1.88% per annum after adjusting
for covariation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven
factors and controlling for the other variables that can
explain fund performance. The effect is statistically
significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the difference
between first and follow-on fund performance is even
stronger for the follow-on funds that are launched
later. The abnormal return spread between the first
and the second to fifth funds launched is a statistically
reliable but economically modest 1.79%, whereas the
analogous spread between the first and the 11th to
20th funds launched is an impressive 3.45% per year.
These findings cannot be explained by differences in
fund share restrictions and illiquidity (Aragon 2007,
Aragon and Strahan 2012), fund fees (Agarwal et al.
2009), age (Aggarwal and Jorion 2010), size (Berk and
Green 2004), return smoothing behavior (Getmansky
et al. 2004), and backfill and incubation bias (Liang
2000, Bhardwaj et al. 2014).
Hedge fund investors do not benefit from the capital-
raising activities ofmultiple-product firms. Portfolio sorts
indicate that multiple-product firms on average under-
perform single-product firms by a statistically reliable
3.77% per annum after adjusting for risk. Yet, despite
underperforming single-product firms, multiple-product
firms harvest fee revenues that are on average US$21.68
million per annum higher than those harvested by single-
product firms. The larger size of the multiple-product
firms explains much of the difference in fee revenue.6
Empirical evidence shows that the outperformance
of the first fund is driven by strong initial perfor-
mance, which moderates after the launch of the first
follow-on fund. Prior to follow-on fund launches, first
funds of multiple-product firms deliver a return of
10.83% per year after adjusting for risk. However,
upon the launch of the first follow-on fund, first
funds’ alpha deteriorates by 5.35% per annum. The
reduction in performance is 1.92% greater than that
for comparable first funds at other firms and is driven
in part by limited attention and the crowding out of
investment opportunities. Instead of protecting the
first fund’s performance by limiting its AUM growth,
multiple-product firms typically grow AUM across
all products, that is, first as well as follow-on.
Investors’ confidence in firms with successful first
funds is not completely misplaced. Stellar first fund
performance is associated with better subsequent
follow-on fund and first fund performance. We find
that, on average, a one percentage point increase in
the first fund’s monthly alpha in the 12-month period
prior to the launch of the first follow-on fund pre-
cipitates a 13.6 basis point increase in follow-on fund
monthly alpha and a 12.6 basis point increase in the
first fund monthly alpha in the 12-month postlaunch
period. Therefore, it seems that investors who sub-
scribe to a new fund launched by a hedge fund firm
with a stellar first fund are responding rationally to
the positive outlook that such an event is signaling at
the beginning of the firm’s capital-raising campaign.
Just as stellar performance of the first fund can help
capital raising for the firm, poor performance of
follow-on funds can be detrimental to this process.
We find evidence of a significant blowback effect from
follow-on funds to the first fund. Lower follow-on fund
returns over the past one and two years are associated
with lower flows into the first fund of the same hedge
fund firm after controlling for past first fund returns,
flows, and performance volatility. This blowback effect
suggests thatfirms need to balance quantitywith quality
when embarking on such a growth path.
The endogeneity of firm growth strategy does not
explain the underperformance of hedge funds launched
later by firms. The multivariate regression methodology
that we employ allows us to sidestep concerns that ob-
served differences between funds managed by single-
and multiple-product firms explain our results. To cater
for unobserved differences between single- andmultiple-
product firms, we run an instrumental variables analysis
with the supply of investment capital at firm founding
as the instrument. We find that first funds outperform
follow-on funds even more after instrumenting for firm
growthstrategy. Similarly, themoregeneral result that the
later funds launched by firms underperform the earlier
funds prevails after instrumenting for firm multiple-
product status. Our choice of instrument follows Asker
et al. (2015) and is robust to alternative specifications.
The results in this paper resonate with two strands
of research on hedge funds. The first strand sheds
light on hedge fund alpha and finds that incentivized
(Agarwal et al. 2009), geographically proximate (Teo
2009), emerging (Aggarwal and Jorion 2010), and
distinctive (Sun et al. 2012) hedge funds deliver
higher alpha. We show that hedge funds that are
conceived earlier by their firms also outperform.7
The second strand examines agency problems and
finds that somehedge funds strategicallydelay reporting
poor performance (Aragon and Nanda 2017), inflate
their December returns (Agarwal et al. 2011), and take
on excessive liquidity risk (Teo 2011).8 We find that,
consistent with the agency view, better incentive
alignment via manager coinvestment, greater weight
on incentive fees, higher manager total deltas, and
elevated flow-performance sensitivity help amelio-
rate the tendency of hedge fund firms to launch
follow-on funds that underperform first funds.
This paper echoes research on the strategic be-
havior of mutual fund families (Massa 2003, Nanda
et al. 2004, Gaspar et al. 2006, Sialm and Tham 2016).
Fung et al.: Hedge Fund Franchises
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Whereas Massa (2003) investigates the relation be-
tween the performance of a mutual fund family in a
category and the degree of product differentiation in
the category, we study the link between the perfor-
mance of a hedge fund firm and the degree of fund or
strategy proliferation in the firm itself. Unlike Nanda
et al. (2004), who document positive spillover effects
in the form of greater flows to the other mutual funds
of families with stars, we show that, for hedge funds,
intrafirm spillover effects extend beyond flows to
include fees, redemption terms, and performance.
Our work complements Kolokolova (2011) and Yin
(2016). Kolokolova (2011) finds that hedge fund firms
with high past returns are more likely to launch new
funds and attract inflows. She does not differentiate
between first and follow-on funds. We believe that
focusing on first funds is critical as stellar first fund
performance allows a firm to transition from a single-
product to a multiple-product firm. Indeed, we show
that the spillover effects are substantially stronger from
first funds to follow-on funds than from follow-on funds
to the later funds launched by the firm. Further, stellar
first fund performance is a reliable harbinger of future
fund launches. Therefore, the performance of the first
fund is a stronger determinant of hedge fund firm
growth than is the performance of the subsequent funds
launched by the same firm. Yin (2016) argues that the
hedge fund management compensation contract in-
duces individual hedge funds to grow beyond that
which is optimal for fund performance. Whereas Yin
(2016) focuses on the growth of the individual hedge
fund, we focus on the growth of the hedge fund firm.
Relative to Kolokolova (2011) and Yin (2016), we
deepen our understanding of firm strategic behavior
by (i) documenting intrafirm spillover effects from
first funds to follow-on funds and vice versa, that is,
the blowback flow effect, (ii) uncovering the relation
between fund launch order and performance, (iii) show-
ing that incentive alignment helps ameliorate the
tendency of firms to launch follow-on funds that
underperform first funds, (iv) exploring intrafirm
fund performance persistence, (v) testing the impact
of firm strategy diversification on fund performance,
and (vi) tracing the deterioration in first fund per-
formance when firms launch follow-on funds to limited
attention and the crowding out of investment oppor-
tunities. By finding evidence of intrafirm performance
persistence, we resolve the conundrum raised by
Kolokolova (2011) about the apparent irrationality of
fund investors that respond to short-lived firm per-
formance. Our results suggest that stellar first fund
performance not only allows first funds to grow
capital beyond the optimal point, as in Yin (2016), but
also allows their management companies to do likewise
via the launch of follow-on funds. Consequently, the
indirect incentives facing hedge fundmanagers, especially
those managing first funds, are likely to be even stronger
than those suggested by Lim et al. (2016).
This research also relates to recent work by Sun and
Teo (2019) on public hedge funds. They find that hedge
funds operated by listed firms significantly under-
perform hedge funds operated by unlisted firms. They
trace the underperformance to the weakened align-
ment between ownership, capital, and control when
fund management companies go public, which en-
genders conflicts of interests. Like Sun and Teo (2019),
we analyze agency problems in the hedge fund in-
dustry. Unlike Sun and Teo (2019), we study the
growth trajectory of hedge fund firms and the per-
formance differential between funds launched at dif-
ferent stages of a firm’s growth. Moreover, unlike Sun
and Teo (2019) who document how public listings
affect the severity of agency problems at hedge fund
firms,we explore the implications of agency problems
on hedge fund firms’ optimal growth strategy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes the data andmethodology. Section 3
reports the results from the empirical analysis, and
Section 4 presents amedleyof robustness tests. Section 5
concludes.
2. Data and Methodology
We evaluate hedge funds using monthly net returns
and AUMdata of live and dead hedge funds reported
in the Lipper Hedge Fund Database (TASS), Hedge
Fund Research (HFR), and BarclayHedge datasets
from January 1990 to December 2013.9 Because TASS,
HFR, and BarclayHedge started distributing their
data in 1994, the data sets do not contain information
on funds that died before December 1993. This gives
rise to survivorship bias. We mitigate this bias by
focusing on data from January 1994 onward.
In our fund universe, we have a total of 16,828 hedge
funds, of which 5,633 are live funds and 11,195 are
dead funds. The funds are roughly evenly split between
the three databases. Although 1,704 funds appear in all
three databases and 3,256 funds appear in two data-
bases, many funds belong to only one database. Spe-
cifically, there are 3,729 funds, 3,735 funds, and 4,404
funds peculiar to the TASS, HFR, and BarclayHedge
databases, respectively. This highlights the advantage
of obtaining data frommultiple sources. In our analysis,
we focus on the sample of funds without duplicate
share classes due to concerns that funds with multi-
ple share classes could cloud the analysis.10 Removing
duplicate share classes from the sample leaves uswith
a total of 15,607 hedge funds, of which 5,269 are live
funds and 10,338 are dead funds.
We define first funds as the first fund launched by
each hedge fund firm. Follow-on funds are the other
funds launched by hedge fund firms. To determine
fund status, we sort our sample of funds based on fund
Fung et al.: Hedge Fund Franchises
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inception date within the firm. To ensure that there is
only one first fund per firm,whenmore than one fund is
launched in the samemonthby afirm,wemerge them to
form a composite fund and treat it as that firm’s first
fund.11 The fund attributes and monthly returns of
the composite fund are simply the average fund at-
tribute and averagemonthly returns of its component
funds, respectively. The monthly AUM of the com-
posite fund is the sum of the monthly AUM of its
component funds.
Following Joenväärä et al. (2020), we classify hedge
funds into 12 investment styles: commodity trading
advisor, emerging markets, event driven, global macro,
long only, equity long/short, market neutral, multi-
strategy, relative value, sector, short bias, and others.
Table 1 breaks down the funds by investment strategy
and reports the first and follow-on fund distribution
as well as the number of live and dead funds in each
strategy. To facilitate comparison with our overall
fund sample, the first funds reported in Table 1 in-
clude all the componentfirst funds launched by hedge
fund firms. So, there are more first funds reported in
Table 1 than there are firms. There are 6,882 firms in
our sample. When the component funds are grouped
together to form composite funds so that each firm is
linked to only one first fund, there are 4,618 firmswith
only one fund, 1,921 firms with two to five funds, 232
firmswith six to 10 funds, 85 firmswith 11 to 20 funds,
and 26 firms with more than 20 funds. The time be-
tween successive fund launches is a decreasing function
of the number of funds already launched by the firm.
After conceiving its first fund, a firm takes about 38
months on average to launch the second fund, another
28 months to launch the third fund, and another 22
months to launch the fourth fund.
Hedge fund data are susceptible to many biases
(Liang 2000, Fung and Hsieh 2009). These biases stem
from the fact that inclusion in hedge fund databases is
voluntary. As a result, there is a self-selection bias. For
instance, funds often undergo an incubation period in
which they rely on internal funding before seeking
capital from outside investors. Incubated funds with
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Follow-on funds
Total funds Dead funds 1st funds 2nd–5th funds 6th–10th funds 11th–20th funds Return months
Investment strategy (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Full sample
Commodity trading advisors 1,507 330 813 537 95 44 89,017
Emerging markets 833 371 320 306 85 46 57,777
Event driven 1,162 329 523 412 125 68 87,973
Global macro 1,949 657 857 727 151 84 117,580
Long only 222 149 62 72 20 18 17,510
Equity long/short 5,341 1,578 2,657 1,772 478 250 377,870
Market neutral 440 96 184 160 46 35 27,780
Multi-strategy 2,222 1,100 839 602 191 184 141,800
Relative value 2,459 815 1,069 880 265 116 152,050
Sector 309 127 132 102 24 25 22,034
Short bias 34 5 19 13 2 0 2,868
Others 350 76 191 124 27 8 18,277
Total 16,828 5,633 7,666 5,707 1,509 878 1,112,500
Panel B: Without duplicate share classes
Commodity trading advisors 1,455 315 804 516 89 32 85,971
Emerging markets 717 306 311 272 63 37 52,458
Event driven 1,053 301 497 364 105 54 80,807
Global macro 1,850 638 841 663 146 74 112,830
Long only 193 130 63 65 20 15 16,065
Equity long/short 4,922 1,498 2,576 1,555 423 208 357,240
Market neutral 389 86 177 141 37 21 24,939
Multi-strategy 2,139 1,077 833 554 174 178 137,370
Relative value 2,268 744 1,043 799 221 98 142,980
Sector 276 107 128 89 23 22 19,967
Short bias 31 4 18 12 1 0 2,626
Others 314 63 188 102 21 3 16,780
Total 15,607 5,269 7,479 5,132 1,323 742 1,050,000
Notes. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. Funds are grouped according to their primary investment strategy. The list of
strategies follows Joenväärä et al. (2020) and includes commodity trading advisors, emerging markets, event driven, global macro, long only,
equity long/short, market neutral, multi-strategy, relative value, sector, short bias, and others.
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successful track records then go on to list in various
hedge fund databases, while the unsuccessful funds
do not, resulting in an incubation bias. Related to this,
when a fund is listed on a database, it often includes
data prior to the listing date. Again, because suc-
cessful funds have a strong incentive to list and attract
capital inflows, these backfilled returns tend to be
higher than the nonbackfilled returns. In the analysis
that follows, we will repeat the tests after dropping
the first 24 months of return data from each fund to
ensure that the results are robust to backfill and in-
cubation bias. To fully address concerns about backfill
bias raised by Bhardwaj et al. (2014) and others, we
also redo the tests after removing all return obser-
vations that have been backfilled prior to the fund
listing date.
Throughout this paper, wemodel the risks of hedge
funds using the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor
model. The Fung and Hsieh factors are the excess
return on the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 index
(SNPMRF); a small minus big factor (SCMLC) con-
structed as the difference between the Wilshire small
and large capitalization stock indices; the yield spread
of the US 10-year Treasury bond over the three-month
Treasury bill, adjusted for duration of the 10-year bond
(BD10RET); the change in the credit spread of Moody’s
BAA bond over the 10-year Treasury bond, also ap-
propriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY); and
the excess returns on portfolios of lookback strad-
dle options on currencies (PTFSFX), commodities
(PTFSCOM), and bonds (PTFSBD), which are con-
structed to replicate the maximum possible return from
trend following strategies (see Fung and Hsieh 2001)
on their respective underlying assets.12 These seven
factors have been shown by Fung and Hsieh (2004)
to have considerable explanatory power on hedge
fund returns.
3. Empirical Results
3.1. Spillover Effects Within Hedge Fund Firms
Our first set of tests focuses on spillover effects within
hedge fund firms. We ask, do hedge fund firms take
advantage of the stellar performance of their first
funds to launch additional funds? If so, how does
superior first fund performance benefit the follow-on
funds managed by the same firm?
To test the relation between first fund performance
and the probability of follow-on fund launches, we
estimate logit regressions on LAUNCH, an indicator
variable that takes a value of one if a firm launches at
least one fund in that year. We include as an in-
dependent variable FIRSTALPHA or first fund alpha
averaged over the last 12, 24, and 36 months. Fund
alpha is fund monthly abnormal return after strip-
ping away covariation with the Fung and Hsieh
(2004) seven factors and is estimated for all funds
with at least 24 months of return information.13 We
control for calendar year fixed effects and base sta-
tistical inferences onWhite (1980) heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level.
The results reported in the leftmost column of Table 2
indicate that past stellar first fund performance is a
reliable harbinger of future fund launches. The co-
efficient estimates on FIRSTALPHA are statistically
significant at the 1% level for all lookback horizons.
The marginal effects indicate that a one standard
deviation (or 0.92 percentage point) increase in
past 36-month alpha is associated with a 0.83 per-
centage point increase in the probability of a fund
launch the next year. This is economically signifi-
cant given that the unconditional probability of la-
unching at least one fund in any year is 7.53 per-
centage points.
Unsurprisingly, the association between first fund
performance and future fund launches is stronger for
the earlier follow-on funds launched by a firm. We
define SECONDALPHA and THIRDALPHA as the
alphas of the second and third funds launched by
the firm, respectively. When we include as an addi-
tional independent variable SECONDALPHA in the
regressions, we find that the coefficient estimates on
FIRSTALPHA are still statistically significant at the
1% or 5% level, whereas those on SECONDALPHA
are not. However, when we also include as an ad-
ditional independent variable THIRDALPHA in the
regressions, we find that the coefficient estimate
on FIRSTALPHA is statistically significant at the 5%
level only for monthly alpha averaged over the last
36 months. This suggests that first fund performance
is a more reliable predictor of the second and third
fund launches than of the later fund launches by
the same firm.
Since, hedge fund investors may not chase complex
risk-adjusted measures such as the Fung and Hsieh
(2004) alpha, we re-estimate the logit regressionswith
fund returns in place of fund alphas. It is comforting
to note that the results are even stronger when we
analyze fund returns. As shown in columns (4)–(6) of
Table 2, the coefficient estimates on FIRSTRET are
significant at the 1% level in the univariate regressions
and in the regressions that control for SECONDRET
over all performance horizons. They are also signif-
icant at the 5% level when we include THIRDRET
as an additional independent variable for monthly
returns averaged over the last 12 or 36months. Simply
put, FIRSTRET, SECONDRET, and THIRDRET are
the fund return equivalents of FIRSTALPHA,
SECONDALPHA, and THIRDALPHA, respectively.14
Collectively, these results suggest that the perfor-
mance of the first fund is a stronger determinant of
firm growth than is the performance of the sub-
sequent funds launched by the same firm.
Fung et al.: Hedge Fund Franchises
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Table 2. Logit Regressions on Probability of Hedge Fund Launch
Dependent variable: LAUNCH
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Regressions with monthly alphas or returns averaged over the last 12 months
FIRSTALPHA 0.056** 0.055* 0.024
(4.73) (2.17) (0.59)
[0.005] [0.008] [0.005]
SECONDALPHA 0.028 0.003
(1.16) (0.09)
[0.004] [0.001]
THIRDALPHA 0.087**
(2.60)
[0.017]
FIRSTRET 0.057** 0.062** 0.063*
(5.91) (2.99) (1.98)
[0.005] [0.009] [0.012]
SECONDRET 0.021 −0.003
(1.05) (−0.11)
[0.003] [−0.001]
THIRDRET 0.067*
(2.53)
[0.013]
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.019 0.025 0.040 0.019 0.026 0.041
Number of observations 38,455 9,285 3,504 39,744 9,741 3,693
Panel B: Regressions with monthly alphas or returns averaged over the last 24 months
FIRSTALPHA 0.091** 0.080* 0.021
(5.60) (2.14) (0.32)
[0.007] [0.013] [0.004]
SECONDALPHA 0.057 0.054
(1.75) (0.95)
[0.005] [0.010]
THIRDALPHA 0.117*
(2.47)
[0.023]
FIRSTRET 0.098** 0.101* 0.066
(7.15) (3.14) (1.22)
[0.008] [0.014] [0.012]
SECONDRET 0.062* 0.037
(2.22) (0.79)
[0.009] [0.007]
THIRDRET 0.100**
(2.57)
[0.019]
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.021 0.028 0.040 0.021 0.029 0.041
Number of observations 37,220 9,056 3,406 38,362 9,490 3,591
Panel C: Regressions with monthly alphas or returns averaged over the last 36 months
FIRSTALPHA 0.124** 0.121** 0.165*
(6.25) (2.72) (2.04)
[0.009] [0.017] [0.031]
SECONDALPHA 0.057 0.020
(1.46) (0.28)
[0.007] [0.004]
THIRDALPHA 0.101
(1.82)
[0.019]
Fung et al.: Hedge Fund Franchises
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Next, we test the relation between the past perfor-
mance of the first fund and the fund attributes of as well
as flows into follow-on funds. Specifically, we estimate
the followingOrdinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions:
FUNDATTRIBUTEi  a + bFIRSTALPHAim−12,m−1
+ cNFIRSTALPHAim−12,m−1
+∑
k
dkSTYLEDUMki
+∑
y
eyYEARDUMyi + εi, (1)
FUNDFLOWim  a + bFIRSTALPHAim−12,m−1
+ cNFIRSTALPHAim−12,m−1
+ dFUNDALPHAim−12,m−1
+ eFUNDFLOWim−12,m−1
+ f FUNDVOLim−12,m−1
+ gFUNDHWMi
+∑
k
hkSTYLEDUMki
+∑
y
oyYEARDUMym + εim, (2)
where, in Equation (1), FIRSTALPHAim−12,m−1 and
NFIRSTALPHAim−12,m−1 are the first and other follow-
on fundmonthly alpha averaged over the last 12months
prior to the launch of fund i in month m, respectively,
FUNDATTRIBUTEi is either follow-on fund man-
agement fee, performance fee, redemption period, or
notice period, STYLEDUMki is follow-on fund style
dummy for style k, and YEARDUMyi is follow-on
fund inception year dummy for year y. We assume
that the fund attributes reported in the commercial
databases are determined at fund launch. In Equa-
tion (2), FUNDFLOWim is own fundmonthly net inflow,
FUNDALPHAim−12,m−1 is own fund monthly alpha
averaged over the last 12 months, FUNDVOLim−12,m−1
is standard deviation of own fund monthly alpha
estimated over the last 12months, and FUNDHWMi is
own fund high-water mark indicator. We also esti-
mate variants of the Equation (1) and (2) regressions
where the monthly alphas are averaged over the last
24 or 36 months.15 Statistical inferences are based on
White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors clustered at the fund level.
The results reported inpanelsA–Cof Table 3 indicate
that stellar first fund performance confers a variety of
benefits to the follow-on funds managed by the same
firm. The coefficient estimates on FIRSTALPHA in the
fund attribute regressions suggest that, after con-
trolling for the performance of the other funds within
the same firm, firms with stellar first funds are able to
raise follow-on funds that charge higher performance
fees as well as set longer redemption and notification
periods.16 The impact of past first fund performance
Table 2. (Continued)
Dependent variable: LAUNCH
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FIRSTRET 0.131** 0.141** 0.169*
(7.35) (3.43) (2.44)
[0.010] [0.019] [0.031]
SECONDRET 0.067 0.018
(1.80) (0.30)
[0.009] [0.003]
THIRDRET 0.085
(1.78)
[0.016]
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.024 0.031 0.045 0.024 0.033 0.046
Number of observations 35,370 8,579 3,231 36,002 8,794 3,321
Notes. Logit regressions are estimated on the probability each year of launching a fund by each hedge
fund firm. The dependent variable is LAUNCH which takes a value of one if a firm launches at least one
fund in a specific year and a value of zero otherwise. The independent variables include FIRSTALPHA,
SECONDALPHA, THIRDALPHA, FIRSTRET, SECONDRET, and THIRDRET, where FIRSTALPHA is the
alpha of the first fund conceived by the firm averaged over the last x months prior to that year,
SECONDALPHA is the alpha of the second (or first follow-on) fund conceived by the firm averaged over
the same period, THIRDALPHA is the alpha of the third (or second follow-on) fund conceived by the firm
averaged over the same period, and FIRSTRET, SECONDRET, and THIRDRET are the fund return
equivalents of FIRSTALPHA, SECONDALPHA, andTHIRDALPHA, respectively. The regressions include
controls for calendar year fixed effects. The z-statistics, derived from robust standard errors clustered by
firm, are in parentheses. Marginal effects are in brackets. In panels A, B, and C, the lookback period x
equals 12, 24, and 36 months, respectively. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013.
*Significant at the 5% level; **significant at the 1% level.
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Table 3. Regressions on Follow-on Fund Attributes and Flow
Independent
variable
Dependent variables
Follow-on fund
management fee
Follow-on fund
performance fee
Follow-on fund
redemption period
Follow-on fund
notice period
Follow-on fund
monthly flow
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Regressions with monthly alphas averaged over the last 12 months
FIRSTALPHA 0.007 0.257** 0.618 1.121** 0.125*
(0.72) (2.84) (1.65) (2.92) (2.39)
NFIRSTALPHA 0.021* 0.342** 0.722 0.987 0.151
(2.10) (3.27) (1.18) (1.86) (1.76)
FUNDALPHA 0.860**
(10.46)
FUNDFLOW 0.268**
(41.97)
FUNDVOL −0.308**
(−14.53)
FUNDHWM 0.227*
(2.19)
Strategy fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 0.050 0.136 0.099 0.113 0.043
Number of
observations
4,757 4,757 4,757 4,757 290,184
Panel B: Regressions with monthly alphas averaged over the last 24 months
FIRSTALPHA 0.01 0.323** 1.276** 1.776** 0.277**
(0.91) (3.46) (2.60) (3.54) (3.75)
NFIRSTALPHA 0.019 0.341** 1.012 1.166 0.168
(1.84) (2.84) (1.58) (1.88) (1.38)
FUNDALPHA 0.877**
(8.62)
FUNDFLOW 0.249**
(38.29)
FUNDVOL −0.358**
(−14.60)
FUNDHWM 0.221*
(2.09)
Strategy fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 0.047 0.139 0.101 0.114 0.037
Number of
observations
4,605 4,605 4,605 4,605 284,420
Panel C: Regressions with monthly alphas averaged over the last 36 months
FIRSTALPHA 0.015 0.415** 1.447* 1.890** 0.397**
(1.21) (4.06) (2.58) (3.29) (4.31)
NFIRSTALPHA 0.024* 0.278* 1.195 1.097 0.174
(2.17) (2.19) (1.77) (1.66) (1.36)
FUNDALPHA 0.838**
(7.88)
FUNDFLOW 0.240**
(36.32)
FUNDVOL −0.406**
(−15.48)
FUNDHWM 0.229*
(2.13)
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on follow-on fund performance fee and on notice period
is statistically significant at the 1%or 5% level regardless
of whether we average first fund alpha over the 12-, 24-,
or 36-month period prior to the follow-on fund launch.
That on follow-on fund redemption period is statisti-
cally significant at the 1% or 5% level when we average
first fund alpha over the 24- or 36-month period prior to
follow-on fund launch. The results are economically
meaningful. For example, a one standard deviation (or
1.44 percentage point) improvement in past 24-month
alpha increases the notice period by 2.56 business days.
This represents a 12.80% increase relative to a baseline
notice period of a month, that is, 20 business days.
Excellent first fund performance also allows hedge
fund firms to raise more capital for their follow-on
funds. The coefficient estimates on FIRSTALPHA in
the fund flow regressions indicate that, after con-
trolling for other factors, the impact of first fund
performance on follow-on fund flow is positive and
statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level for alpha
averaged over the past 12, 24, and 36 months. Spe-
cifically, a one standard deviation (or 1.44 percentage
point) improvement in monthly alpha over the past
24 months is associated with a 0.40% increase in in-
flows into follow-on funds the next month. We note
that the impact of first fund performance on follow-on
fund flow is about 31.58% as large as that of own
follow-on fund performance, at least based on per-
formance averaged over the past 24 months. Collec-
tively, these results indicate that hedge fund firms are
incentivized to deliver stellar performance with their
first funds so as to raise follow-on funds on favorable
terms. We note that superior follow-on fund perfor-
mance is associated with higher performance fees for
the later follow-on funds launched, although the
spillover effects from follow-on funds in general
appear to be weaker than those from first funds.
Do these spillover results apply uniquely to first funds
as opposed to the second and other follow-on funds
launchedbyhedge fundfirms?To test,were-estimate the
Equation (1) and (2) regressions on the fund attributes
of and flows into the third and later funds launched by
hedge fund firms. We include SECONDALPHA and
NSECONDALPHA as independent variables in place
of FIRSTALPHA and NFIRSTALPHA, respectively,
where SECONDALPHA isfirst follow-on fundmonthly
alpha and NSECONDALPHA is fund monthly alpha
averaged over all other funds in the firm. The results,
reported in Table A.1 of the online appendix, indicate
that the spillover effects from first follow-on funds are
substantially weaker than those from first funds. Al-
though stellar first follow-on fund performance is asso-
ciatedwith longer redemption and notice periods for the
subsequent follow-on funds launched by the same firm,
it is not associated reliably with higher performance fees
or, more importantly, higher flows into those funds.17
3.2. Tests of Hedge Fund Performance
To testwhether the stronger incentives that first funds
face translate to superior performance, we evaluate
the performance of first funds relative to that of
follow-on funds. Every month, we sort funds within
Table 3. (Continued)
Independent
variable
Dependent variables
Follow-on fund
management fee
Follow-on fund
performance fee
Follow-on fund
redemption period
Follow-on fund
notice period
Follow-on fund
monthly flow
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Strategy fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 0.046 0.139 0.102 0.111 0.035
Number of
observations
4,455 4,455 4,455 4,455 276,876
Notes. Regressions are estimated on the fees, redemption terms, and flows for follow-on funds managed by each hedge fund firm. For each firm,
we distinguish between the first fund launched and other follow-on funds. In the fund attribute regressions, the independent variables include
FIRSTALPHA andNFIRSTALPHA, where FIRSTALPHA is the alpha of the first fundwithin the same firm averaged over the last xmonths prior to
the launch of the follow-on fund andNFIRSTALPHA is the alpha of the other follow-on fundswithin the samefirm averaged over the last xmonths
prior to the launch of the follow-on fund. In the fund flow regressions, the independent variables include FIRSTALPHA, NFIRSTALPHA,
FUNDALPHA, FUNDFLOW, FUNDVOL, and FUNDHWM, where FUNDALPHA is own fund alpha averaged over the last x months,
FUNDFLOW is own fund flow averaged over the last x months, FUNDVOL is standard deviation of own fund abnormal returns estimated
over the last x months, and FUNDHWM is own fund high-water mark indicator. Fund management fee and performance fee are in percentage,
whereas fund redemption period and notice period are in business days. The regressions include controls for follow-on fund investment style and
year fixed effects. Inception year fixed effects are used for the regressions on follow-on fund characteristics while calendar year fixed effects are
used in the regressions on follow-on fund flow. The t-statistics, derived from robust standard errors that are clustered at the fund level, are in
parentheses. In panels A, B, and C, the lookback period x equals 12, 24, and 36 months, respectively. The sample period is from January 1994 to
December 2013.
*Significant at the 5% level; **significant at the 1% level.
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each hedge fund firm into 20 portfolios based on fund
inception date. The nth portfolio corresponds to the
nth fund launched by the firm. The first portfolio is
simply the first fund portfolio. The other portfolios
are the follow-on fund portfolios sorted by launch
date within the firm. Next, we average the returns
of each fund inception portfolio across hedge fund
firms and evaluate the performance of the first fund
(portfolio A), the second to fifth funds launched (port-
folio B), the sixth to 10th funds launched (portfolio C),
and the 11th to 20th funds launched (portfolio D) rela-
tive to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model.
Portfolio B is simply the average of the second to fifth
fund inception portfolios. The other follow-on fund
portfolios are defined analogously. Since there are
relatively few firms that launch 10 or more funds, the
average number of funds in these portfolios decreases
as we go from portfolio A to portfolio D. On average,
portfolio A comprises 2,238 funds, portfolio B covers
348 funds, portfolio C encompasses 67 funds, and port-
folio D contains 18 funds. Statistical inferences are
based on White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors.
The results from the fund inception date sort, re-
ported in panel A of Table 4, indicate that first funds
outperform follow-on funds. Portfolio A delivers an
average return of 5.28% per annum after adjusting for
covariation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors,
whereas portfolio B delivers an average risk-adjusted
return of 3.49%. The risk-adjusted spread between
these two portfolios is statistically significant at the
1% level (t-statistic = 5.68) but economicallymodest at
1.79% per annum after adjusting for risk. The abnormal
spread rises to a more impressive 3.45% per annum
when we move from portfolio B to portfolio D. These
results suggest that the later funds launched by a
hedge fund firm tend to underperform the earlier funds
launched by the samefirm. Since small hedge fundsmay
not be relevant to large institutional investors, we also
conduct the portfolio sort on the sample of hedge funds
with at least US$20million ofAUM.The results reported
in panel B of Table 4 indicate that our findings are not
driven by the smallest funds in the sample.
Figure 1 complements the results from panel A of
Table 4. It illustrates the monthly cumulative abnormal
returns (henceforth CARs) from the portfolio of first
funds (portfolio A) and the portfolios of follow-on funds
(portfolios B, C, and D). CAR is the cumulative differ-
ence between a portfolio’s excess return and its factor
loadings (estimated over the entire sample period)
multiplied by the Fung and Hsieh (2004) risk factors.
The CARs in Figure 1 indicate that portfolio A con-
sistently outperforms portfolios B, C, and D over the
entire sample period.
There are concerns that first funds may outperform
follow-on funds because the former funds manage
fewer assets and therefore are less affected by capacity
constraints (Berk and Green 2004). To allay such con-
cerns, we estimate the following pooled OLS regression:
ALPHAim  a + bFIRSTi + clog SIZEim−1( )
+ dMGTFEEi + ePERFFEEi
+ fNOTICEi + gAGEim
+∑
k
hkSTYLEDUMki
+∑
y
lyYEARDUMym + εim, (3)
where ALPHA is fund monthly abnormal return after
stripping away covariation with the Fung and Hsieh
(2004) seven factors, FIRST is an indicator variable
that takes a value of one when a fund is a first fund
and a value of zero otherwise, SIZE is fund monthly
AUM in millions of US$, MGTFEE is fund manage-
ment fee in percentage,PERFFEE is fund performance
fee in percentage, NOTICE is fund redemption noti-
fication period inmonths,AGE is fund age in decades,
STYLEDUM is fund style dummy, and YEARDUM
is year dummy. The coefficient estimate on FIRST
provides an indication of the spread in risk-adjusted
performance between first and follow-on funds. To
facilitate the estimation of fund alpha, we only in-
clude results for funds with at least 24 months of
return data. We also estimate the analogous regression
on rawmonthly fund returns to ensure that ourfindings
are not artifacts of the risk adjustment methodology.
Statistical inferences are based on White (1980) heter-
oskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at
the fund level.
The results from the cross-sectional regression anal-
ysis are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5. They
corroborate the findings of the portfolio sorts and
indicate that first funds outperform follow-on funds.
Specifically, the coefficient estimate on FIRST in the
alpha regression reported in column (2) of Table 5
reveals that, after controlling for other factors that
could explain fund performance, first funds out-
perform follow-on funds by 1.88% per annum after
adjusting for risk. The coefficient estimates on the
other control variables accord with the extant litera-
ture. High-powered incentives or fees (Agarwal et al.
2009) and longer redemption notice periods (Aragon
2007) are associated with superior performance,
whereas fund age is linked to poorer performance
(Aggarwal and Jorion 2010). Inferences do not change
when we estimate the regression on raw returns
suggesting that our findings are not driven by our risk
adjustment technology.
To check for robustness, we estimate Fama and
MacBeth (1973) regressions in place of the OLS re-
gressions. We compute the standard errors using the
Fung et al.: Hedge Fund Franchises
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method of Newey and West (1987) with a three-
month lag to adjust for dependence across time.
The Fama and MacBeth (1973) results reported in
columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 echo our previous
findings and indicate that they are robust to alter-
native model specifications.
The portfolio sorts in Table 4 not only suggest
that first funds outperform follow-on funds but also
allude to the more general finding that the earlier
funds launched tend to outperform the later funds
launched by the same firm. To test the impact of fund
chronology in a regression setting, we re-estimate the
Equation (3) regressions with CHRONO in place of
FIRST, where CHRONO is fund launch order within
the firm. The results reported in columns (5)–(8) of
Table 5 indicate that, after controlling for the other
factors that influence fund performance, funds that are
launched earlier outperform funds that are launched
later within each firm. The results are economically and
statistically significant. The OLS coefficient estimate on
CHRONO in column (6) of Table 5 reveals that a one
standard deviation or 6.90 fund increase in fund
launch order is associated with a 1.16% per annum
reduction in fund alpha.18
To test whether the underperformance of follow-on
funds is driven by agency problems at hedge funds,
we compare the performance differential between
first and follow-on funds for hedge funds sorted by
incentive alignment. One way to align incentives is
for themanager to coinvest personal capital alongside
her limited partners. Hence, we sort funds into those
with andwithout personal capital and re-estimate the
Equation (3) regressions. This is only possible for
TASS funds since only TASS provides information on
personal capital. The results reported in panel A of
Table 6 indicate that, consistent with the agency view,
the outperformance of first funds is largely driven by
funds with poor incentive alignment, that is, those
with no personal capital.19
To further investigate the agency view, each year, we
sort hedge funds into equal groups based on three ad-
ditional proxies for incentive alignment: (i) the weight on
fund incentive fee, that is, the ratio of fund performance
fee to management fee, (ii) fund manager total delta, and
(iii) fund flow-performance sensitivity, and re-estimate
the Equation (3) regressions. Total delta is computed
at the end of the prior year and per appendix A
of Agarwal et al. (2009). Fund flow-performance
Figure 1. (Color online) Cumulative Abnormal Return of Funds Sorted on Fund Inception Date
Notes. Portfolios of hedge funds are constructed by sorting funds based on fund inception date. For each hedge fundfirm, the first fund is the first
fund launched by the firm. The first fund portfolio is the equal-weighted return of the first funds across firms. The other portfolios are defined
analogously. Cumulative abnormal return is the cumulative difference between a portfolio’s excess return and its factor loadings multiplied by
risk factors from the Fung andHsieh (2004) seven-factormodel. Factor loadings are estimated over the entire sample period. The sample period is
from January 1994 to December 2013.
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sensitivity is computed using the past rolling 36months
of flow and return data. Agarwal et al. (2009) argue
that performance fees and manager deltas help align
managers’ interests with those of their investors. We
contend that funds with higher flow-performance
sensitivity also have greater incentive alignment.
The results reported in panels B, C, and D of Table 6
are broadly consistent with the agency view. First
funds outperform follow-on funds more for funds
with below-median or low weights on performance
fee than for fundswith above-median or highweights
on performance fee. Similarly, the performance spread
between first and follow-on funds tends to be larger
for funds with low manager total deltas than for funds
with high manager total deltas. Moreover, the under-
performance of follow-on funds is greater for funds
with low flow-performance sensitivity than for those
with high flow-performance sensitivity.
3.3. Tests of Hedge Fund Firm Performance
Do investors benefit when hedge fund firms deliver
superior performance with their first funds and
subsequently raise capital via follow-on funds? It is
not clear whether the superior performance of the
first fund more than compensates for the inferior
performance of the follow-on funds launched by a
hedge fund firm. To investigate, we estimate the
Equation (3) OLS and Fama-MacBeth regressions
with the independent variable NFUNDS in addition
to FIRST.20 The variable NFUNDS is the number of
funds launched by the hedge fund firm. The multi-
variate regression results reported in columns (1)–(4)
of Table 7 are consistentwith the asset-gathering view
in which hedge fund firms with successful first funds
take advantage of their stellar track records and raise
follow-on funds that subsequently underperform. The
coefficient estimates on NFUNDS are negative and
statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level for all re-
gression specifications.
The asset-gathering view further predicts that,
in order to grow capital aggressively, firms will
offer funds in multiple divergent investment strat-
egies to cater to an investor preference for diver-
sification (Massa 2003). To test this view, estimate
Table 5. Regressions on Hedge Fund Performance
Dependent variable
OLS Fama-MacBeth OLS Fama-MacBeth
RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FIRST 0.146** 0.157** 0.131** 0.140**
(10.22) (10.97) (7.33) (8.14)
CHRONO −0.011** −0.014** −0.021** −0.022**
(−13.98) (−16.51) (−3.49) (−4.90)
log(SIZE) −0.037** −0.018** −0.043** −0.022** −0.039** −0.020** −0.043** −0.022**
(−8.78) (−4.25) (−3.94) (−2.65) (−9.20) (−4.62) (−3.97) (−2.69)
MGTFEE 0.033** 0.051** 0.037 0.054* 0.036** 0.057** 0.041 0.060**
(2.81) (4.16) (1.68) (2.51) (3.11) (4.66) (1.84) (2.77)
PERFFEE 0.009** 0.019** 0.008* 0.014** 0.008** 0.018** 0.007** 0.014**
(7.56) (14.53) (2.30) (5.99) (6.91) (13.81) (2.25) (5.97)
NOTICE 0.001** 0.001** 0.002** 0.002** 0.001** 0.001** 0.002** 0.002**
(2.90) (3.12) (3.47) (3.69) (2.87) (3.06) (3.47) (3.62)
AGE −0.131** −0.158** −0.192** −0.254** −0.137** −0.173** −0.194** −0.261**
(−8.31) (−9.87) (−4.30) (−5.56) (−8.67) (−10.69) (-4.35) (−5.70)
Strategy fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar year fixed effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Adj R2 0.028 0.012 0.088 0.051 0.028 0.012 0.089 0.052
Number of observations 745,903 686,277 3,121 3,364 745,903 686,277 3,121 3,364
Notes. OLS and Fama and Macbeth (1973) regressions are estimated on the cross section of hedge fund performance. The dependent variable is
hedge fund monthly return (RETURN) or alpha (ALPHA), where ALPHA is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model.
The indicator variable FIRST takes a value of onewhen a fund is the first fund launched by a firm and a value of zero otherwise,CHRONO is fund
launch order within the firm, SIZE is last month fund assets under management in millions of US$, MGTFEE is fund management fee in
percentage, PERFFEE is fund performance fee in percentage, NOTICE is fund redemption notice period in months, and AGE is fund age in
decades. The regressions include controls for fund investment style fixed effects and calendar year fixed effects (for the OLS regressions). The
t-statistics are in parentheses. For the OLS regressions, they are derived from robust standard errors that are clustered by fund, and for the Fama-
MacBeth regressions, they are derived fromNewey andWest (1987) standard errors with a three-month lag. The sample period is from January
1994 to December 2013.
*Significant at the 5% level; **significant at the 1% level.
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the Equation (3) OLS and Fama-MacBeth regressions
with the independent variable STRATCORR in ad-
dition to FIRST. The variable STRATCORR is the
average pairwise correlation of the strategies engaged
by the firm. The advantage of analyzing strategy
divergence as opposed to the number of strategies
within each firm is that we avoid commingling firms
that engage in multiple but similar investment strat-
egies with firms that pursue multiple and divergent
investment strategies. The latter is more consonant
with a growth-oriented asset-gathering strategy that
caters to an investor preference for diversification.
The results reported in columns (5)–(8) of Table 7
indicate that firms managing divergent strategies
Table 6. Regressions on Hedge Fund Performance for Funds Stratified by
Incentive Alignment
Dependent variable
OLS Fama-MacBeth OLS Fama-MacBeth
RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA
Independent
variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Funds sorted by personal capital
Personal capital Without personal capital
FIRST 0.040 0.018 0.107* 0.039 0.120** 0.114** 0.155** 0.123**
(0.77) (0.34) (2.07) (1.06) (3.50) (3.26) (3.25) (3.13)
Panel B: Funds sorted by performance fee to management fee ratio
High performance fees relative to
management fees
Low performance fees relative to
management fees
FIRST 0.164** 0.131** 0.133** 0.095** 0.229** 0.227** 0.146** 0.151**
(7.19) (5.76) (5.41) (4.30) (8.51) (8.63) (3.85) (4.62)
Panel C: Funds sorted by past manager total delta
High manager total delta Low manager total delta
FIRST 0.125** 0.097** 0.145** 0.099** 0.139** 0.160** 0.112** 0.126**
(5.33) (4.54) (5.17) (4.74) (5.58) (6.66) (4.50) (5.46)
Panel D: Funds sorted by past 36-month flow-performance sensitivity
High flow-performance sensitivity Low flow-performance sensitivity
FIRST 0.083** 0.113** 0.072* 0.088** 0.138** 0.159** 0.144** 0.157**
(2.95) (4.65) (2.37) (2.95) (4.52) (5.95) (3.16) (3.80)
Notes. OLS and Fama and Macbeth (1973) regressions are estimated on the cross-section of hedge fund
performance for funds stratified by proxies for incentive alignment. The dependent variable is hedge
fund monthly return (RETURN) or alpha (ALPHA), where ALPHA is estimated relative to the Fung and
Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. The indicator variable FIRST takes a value of one when a fund is the
first fund launched by a firm and a value of zero otherwise. The independent variables are MGTFEE,
PERFFEE, NOTICE, log(SIZE), and AGE, where MGTFEE is fund management fee in percentage,
PERFFEE is fund performance fee in percentage, NOTICE is fund redemption notice period in months,
SIZE is last month fund assets under management in millions of US$, and AGE is fund age in decades.
The OLS regressions include controls for fund investment style and calendar year fixed effects. The
t-statistics are in parentheses. For the OLS regressions, they are derived from robust standard errors that
are clustered by fund, and for the Fama-MacBeth regressions, they are derived from Newey and West
(1987) standard errors with a three-month lag. The coefficient estimates on the control variables are
omitted for brevity. In panel A, funds are sorted based onmanager personal capital. In panel B, funds
are sorted based onwhether their weights on performance fee, that is, performance fee/management fee
are higher or lower than the median that year. In panel C, funds are sorted based on whether their
manager total deltas (Agarwal et al. 2009) computed at the end of the previous year are higher or lower
than the median. In panel D, funds are sorted based on whether their flow-performance sensitivities
estimated over the last 36months are higher or lower than themedian. Columns (1)–(4) report results for
funds with stronger incentive alignment. Columns (5)–(8) report results for funds with weaker incentive
alignment. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013.
*Significant at the 5% level; **significant at the 1% level.
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underperform firms managing correlated strategies.
The coefficient estimates on STRATCORR are positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level across all
regression specifications. These findings dovetail with
the asset-gathering view.
3.4. Tests of Hedge Fund Firm Revenue
How does raising multiple funds affect the total fee
revenue that accrues to the firm management com-
pany? To investigate, we sort firms into five portfolios
based on the number of funds launched. Next, we
evaluate the total firm fee revenue (management fee
plus performance fee) over the subsequent one-year
period. Fund performance fee is calculated per the
assumptions in appendix A of Agarwal et al. (2009).
We find that hedge fund management companies
benefit significantly from launchingmultiple funds or
products. Multiple-product firms in portfolio 5 (firms
with many funds) harvest an annual fee revenue of
US$25.50 million, which is US$21.68 million greater
than that harvested by the average single-product
firm in portfolio 1 (firms with one fund). The differ-
ence in fee revenues is statistically significant at the
1% level.21 On average, firms in portfolio 5 manage
US$866.44 million, whereas firms in portfolio 1 manage
only US$95.37 million. The AUM spread may therefore
drive much of the fee revenue difference.
To test whether the higher fee revenues of multiple-
product firms are indeed by-products of their greater
AUMs, we perform a double sort on firm AUM and on
the number of funds launched. The results indicate that
themultiple-product growth strategy engenders greater
fee revenues largely through its effect on firm AUM.
Once we control for firm AUM, the spread in fee rev-
enues between multiple- and single-product firms is
typically insignificant. The spread in fee revenues is only
significant for the firms in the largest AUM quintile.
Taken together, these results suggest that hedge fund
firms (not investors) benefit from the multiple-product
growth strategy. Unsurprisingly, we find that this has
Table 7. Regressions on Hedge Fund Performance with Firm Variables
Dependent variable
OLS Fama-MacBeth OLS Fama-MacBeth
RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NFUNDS −0.006** −0.009** −0.009* −0.011**
(−10.45) (−13.85) (−2.12) (−3.81)
STRATCORR 0.268** 0.267** 0.274** 0.244**
(4.85) (4.62) (3.21) (4.02)
FIRST 0.103** 0.096** 0.089** 0.083** 0.109** 0.120** 0.095** 0.104**
(6.93) (6.43) (5.33) (5.35) (6.75) (7.37) (4.73) (5.74)
log(SIZE) −0.037** −0.017** −0.041** −0.02* −0.036** −0.017** −0.041** −0.020*
(−8.64) (−4.04) (−3.78) (−2.42) (−8.36) (−3.82) (−3.79) (−2.41)
MGTFEE 0.037** 0.057** 0.041 0.061** 0.033** 0.051** 0.038 0.054*
(3.15) (4.71) (1.85) (2.78) (2.82) (4.16) (1.69) (2.47)
PERFFEE 0.008** 0.017** 0.007* 0.014** 0.009** 0.019** 0.007* 0.014**
(6.67) (13.53) (2.15) (5.80) (7.37) (14.43) (2.20) (5.88)
NOTICE 0.001** 0.001** 0.002** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.002** 0.002**
(2.73) (2.91) (3.29) (3.40) (2.78) (3.02) (3.30) (3.52)
AGE −0.130** −0.156** −0.181** −0.241** −0.126** −0.153** −0.187** −0.249**
(−8.26) (−9.83) (−4.13) (−5.43) (−8.09) (−9.65) (−4.11) (−5.39)
Strategy fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar year fixed effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Adj R2 0.028 0.012 0.089 0.053 0.028 0.012 0.089 0.051
Number of observations 7,45,903 6,86,277 3,121 3,364 7,45,865 6,86,239 3,121 3,364
Notes. OLS and Fama and Macbeth (1973) regressions are estimated on the cross-section of hedge fund performance. The dependent variable is
hedge fund monthly return (RETURN) or alpha (ALPHA), where ALPHA is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model.
The independent variables include NFUNDS, STRATCORR, FIRST, log(SIZE), MGTFEE, PERFFEE, NOTICE, and AGE, where NFUNDS is the
number of funds launched by the firm, STRATCORR is the average pairwise correlation of the strategies that the fund’s firm engages in, FIRST is
an indicator variable that takes a value of one when a fund is the first fund launched by a firm and a value of zero otherwise, SIZE is last month
fund assets under management in millions of US$, MGTFEE is fund management fee in percentage, PERFFEE is fund performance fee in
percentage,NOTICE is fund redemption notice period in months, andAGE is fund age in decades. The regressions also include controls for fund
investment style fixed effects and calendar year fixed effects (for the OLS regressions). The t-statistics are in parentheses. For the OLS regressions,
they are derived from robust standard errors that are clustered by fund, whereas for the Fama-MacBeth regressions, they are derived from
Newey and West (1987) standard errors with a three-month lag. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013.
*Significant at the 5% level; **significant at the 1% level.
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become the dominant business model for hedge fund
firms. At the start of our sample period, multiple-
product firms manage 47.14% of funds (by number)
and 62.56% of industry assets. By the end of the sample
period, multiple-product firmsmanage 68.94% of funds
(by number) and 77.19% of industry assets.
3.5. Event Study
Do firms protect the performance of their first funds
while simultaneously operating other follow-on funds?
To investigate, we first plot the monthly abnormal
returns of the average first fund 36 months before to
36months after the launch of the first follow-on fund by
the same firm. To accommodate the 36-month window,
the fund sample we analyze only includes first funds
whose firms raised a subsequent fund between January
1997 and December 2010 and that report returns in the
24-month period before and in the 24-month period
after the launch of the follow-on fund.
The resultant graph in Figure 2 suggests that first
fund performance deteriorates once the firm launches
a subsequent fund. The average annual first fund risk-
adjusted return prior to the follow-on fund launch
is 10.83%, whereas the analogous return after the
follow-on fund launch is 5.48%. This implies that first
fund performance deteriorates by 5.35% once the firm
launches another fund. In Figure 2, we also plot the
AUM of the average first fund over the same event
window. We find that, despite the deterioration in first
fund performance, the average first fund is able to in-
crease its AUM by 51% from US$193 million to US$292
million in the 36-month period after the launch of the
first follow-on fund by the same firm. This represents a
substantial increase inAUMon the back of a 72%growth
in AUM from US$112 million to US$193 million over
the 36-month period prior to the launch.
To account for endogeneity concerns driven by ob-
servable differences between firms that launch follow-
on funds and firms that do not, we match event hedge
funds with nonevent hedge funds based on fund per-
formance, AUM, and fee revenue in the 24-month pre-
launch period and conduct a difference-in-differences
analysis. For example, in the fund abnormal return or
alpha analysis, event funds are matched to nonevent
funds by minimizing the sum of the absolute differences
in monthly fund abnormal return in the 24-month pre-
launch period. Table 8 reports differences in fund
return, alpha, AUM, and fee revenue before and after
the launch of the first follow-on fund relative to the
matched sample. The results reported in panels A–D
Figure 2. (Color online) Average Monthly Abnormal Return and Assets Under Management of First Funds Before and After
Launch of the First Follow-on Fund by the Same Firm
Notes. Monthly abnormal return is the difference between a portfolio’s excess return and its factor loadings multiplied by risk factors from the
Fung andHsieh (2004) seven-factormodel. Factor loadings are estimated over the entire sample period. For each hedge fund firm, the first fund is
the first fund launched by the firm. First fund abnormal returns and assets under management (AUM) are averaged across firms. The sample
includes firms that launch at least one follow-on fund from January 1997 to December 2013. Month 0 denotes the inception month for the first
follow-on fund managed by the same firm. The abnormal return graph is represented by the solid line (y-axis on the left), whereas the AUM
graph is represented by the dashed line (y-axis on the right). The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013.
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Table 8. Event Study with Differences-in-Differences Analysis
Before After Difference (after − before) t-statistic of difference
Fund attribute (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panels A–D: Control funds matched based on monthly returns, alpha, AUM, or fee revenue
Panel A: First fund return
Fund return (percent/month), treatment group 1.41 0.81 −0.60** −13.17
Fund return (percent/month), control group 1.17 0.72 −0.45** −9.83
Difference in return (percent/month) 0.25 0.09 −0.16** −4.24
Panel B: First fund alpha
Fund alpha (percent/month), treatment group 0.90 0.46 −0.45** −11.27
Fund alpha (percent/month), control group 0.64 0.35 −0.29** −7.52
Difference in alpha (percent/month) 0.26 0.10 −0.16** −4.36
Panel C: First fund AUM
Fund AUM (US$m), treatment group 140.31 245.93 105.62** 59.97
Fund AUM (US$m), control group 137.90 217.31 79.41** 59.77
Difference in AUM (US$m) 2.41 28.61 26.21** 14.16
Panel D: First fund fee revenue
Fund fee revenue (US$m/year), treatment group 5.71 9.01 3.30** 44.88
Fund fee revenue (US$m/year), control group 5.76 8.26 2.50** 23.52
Difference in fee revenue (US$m/year) −0.05 0.75 0.80** 6.97
Panels E–H: Control funds matched based on fund age and monthly returns, alpha, AUM, or fee revenue
Panel E: First fund return
Fund return (percent/month), treatment group 1.41 0.81 −0.60 −13.17
Fund return (percent/month), control group 1.11 0.66 −0.46 −11.47
Difference in return (percent/month) 0.30 0.15 −0.15** −3.70
Panel F: First fund alpha
Fund alpha (percent/month), treatment group 0.90 0.46 −0.45 −11.27
Fund alpha (percent/month), control group 0.63 0.32 −0.30 −10.48
Difference in alpha (percent/month) 0.27 0.13 −0.14** −3.62
Panel G: First fund AUM
Fund AUM (US$m), treatment group 140.31 245.93 105.62 59.97
Fund AUM (US$m), control group 117.34 197.70 80.36 62.07
Difference in AUM (US$m) 22.97 48.22 25.25** 15.59
Panel H: First fund fee revenue
Fund fee revenue (US$m/year), treatment group 5.71 9.01 3.30 44.88
Fund fee revenue (US$m/year), control group 4.27 7.40 3.14 31.08
Difference in fee revenue (US$m/year) 1.44 1.61 0.16 1.59
Notes. This table reports results from an event study analysis of first fund attributes around the launch of the first follow-on fund by the same
hedge fund firm. First funds are the first funds launched by each hedge fundfirm. The fund attributes analyzed include fund return, alpha, AUM,
and fee revenue. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. Event month is the month that the first follow-on
fund is launched. The period “before” is the 36-month period before the event month, and the period “after” is the 36-month period after the
event month. To be included in the analysis, a first fundmust survive at least 24 months before and after the event month. In panels A, B, C, and
D, funds in the control group arematched to funds in the treatment group based on fund return, alpha, AUM, or fee revenue in the 24-month pre-
event period. For example, in the fund return analysis, funds in the control group arematched to funds in the treatment group byminimizing the
sum of the absolute differences in monthly fund return in the 24-month pre-event period. In panels E, F, G, and H, funds in the control group are
first matched to funds in the treatment group based on minimizing the absolute difference in calendar years since inception. Next, funds in the
closest calendar year group are matched to the treatment group based on fund return, alpha, AUM, or fee revenue in the 24-month pre-event
period. The t-statistics are derived from White (1980) standard errors. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013.
*Significant at the 5% level; **significant at the 1% level.
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of Table 8 indicate that, relative to the matched
sample, first fund annualized return and alpha fall by
1.92% after the launch of the first follow-on fund. At
the same time, relative to comparable funds,first fund
AUM and fee revenue increase by US$26.21 million
and US$0.80 million per annum, respectively.
There are concerns that the aforementionedmatching
criterion may not be adequate. For example, Aggarwal
and Jorion (2010) show that hedge fund performance
may be a function of fund age. Therefore, we also
match event hedge funds with nonevent hedge funds
based on fund age, in addition to fund performance,
AUM, or fee revenues. Specifically, in the fund ab-
normal return analysis, event funds are matched to
nonevent funds by minimizing the absolute differ-
ence in calendar years since inception. If there are
multiple matches based on fund age, we choose the
matching fund that minimizes the sum of the absolute
differences in monthly fund abnormal return in the
24-month prelaunch period. The results largely sur-
vive this modified matching algorithm. Relative to the
matched sample based on fund age and performance,
first fund annualized return and alpha fall by 1.80% and
1.68%, respectively, after the launch of the first follow-
on fund.
Are the results specific to the launchof thefirst follow-
on fund? That is, do the launches of subsequent
follow-on funds also coincide with deteriorations in
the performance of the first fund? To test, we redo the
difference-in-differences analysis for the launch of
the second or later follow-on funds and report the
findings in panels A–D of Table 9. The results indicate
that first fund performance deteriorates when a firm
launches its second and later follow-on funds as well,
although the deteriorations tend to be smaller in mag-
nitude for each successive follow-on fund launched.
Moreover, although first funds grow their AUMs and fee
revenues around the launch of each later follow-on fund,
the increase is lower than that experienced by other
matching first funds that do not launch later follow-
on funds.
What drives the drop in first fund performance
after a firm launches its first follow-on fund? First, the
first funds at firms that launch subsequent funds may
be simply lucky and their performance mean reverts
once their luck runs out. Second, partners at firms that
launch follow-on funds may be busy managing those
follow-on funds and cannot devote as much of their
time to driving the investment process at the first
fund. Third, follow-on funds may crowd out the in-
vestment opportunities at first funds, especially if the
former are engaged in the same strategies as the latter.
We argue that the evidence of first fund performance
persistence around the launch of the first follow-on
fund by the same firm discussed in the next section is
inconsistent with the first story.
To explore the second story, we divide first funds
into first funds managed by the same principals
(group I) and different principals (group II) as those
at the first follow-on funds in the same firm and redo
the event study analysis. The results reported in
panels E–H of Table 9 indicate that the performance
deterioration for group I is greater than that for group II.
These results are consonant with the view that limited
attention explains some of the deterioration in first
fund performance.
To test the third story, we stratify first funds into
those that engage in the same strategies (group III)
and different strategies (group IV) as the first follow-
on funds from the same firm and redo the event study
analysis. The results reported in panels I–L of Table 9
indicate that the performance deterioration for group III
is more pronounced than that for group IV. These
results are supportive of the view that the crowding
out effect explains part of the deterioration in first fund
performance.22
3.6. Intrafirm Performance Spillovers
Are firms with first funds that delivered stellar per-
formance skilled or simply lucky? One view is that
these firms are simply growing capital opportunis-
tically in the wake of a lucky run at the first fund.
However, that view necessarily calls into question the
rationality of hedge fund investors who subscribe to
the first and follow-on funds launched by such firms.
To investigate, we test the relation between first fund
performance prior to the launch of the first follow-
on fund and the performance of the follow-on fund
postinception. Specifically, we estimate the following
regression on first follow-on fund performance:
NFIRSTALPHAim,m+11  a + bFIRSTALPHAim−12,m−1
+ clog NFIRSTSIZEim( )
+ dNFIRSTMGTFEEi
+ eNFIRSTPERFFEEi
+ fNFIRSTNOTICEi
+∑
k
gkNFIRSTSTYLEDUMki
+∑
y
hyYEARDUMym + εim,
(4)
where m is the first follow-on fund inception month,
NFIRSTALPHAim,m+11 is follow-on fund abnormal
return averaged over the 12-month postinception
period, FIRSTALPHAim−12,m−1 is first fund abnormal
return averaged over the 12-month preinception period,
NFIRSTSIZEim is follow-on fund size in millions of
US$ at fund inception, NFIRSTMGTFEEi is follow-on
fundmanagement fee in percentage,NFIRSTPERFFEEi
is follow-on fund performance fee in percentage,
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NFIRSTNOTICEi is follow-on fund redemption no-
tification period in months, NFIRSTSTYLEDUMki is
follow-on fundstyledummyfor style k, andYEARDUMym
is follow-on fund inception year dummy for year y.
We estimate the univariate version of the regression
as well as two other versions where fund abnormal
returns are averaged over 24 and 36 months instead
of over 12 months. Statistical inferences are based on
White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors clustered at the firm level. The coefficient es-
timates reported in columns (1)–(6) of Table A.2 in the
online appendix suggest that fund risk-adjusted per-
formance persists within hedge fund firms. A one
percentage point increase in first fundmonthly alpha in
the 12-month period prior to the launch of the first
follow-on fund is associated with a 13.6 basis point
increase in follow-on fund monthly alpha in the 12-
month postlaunch period that is statistically significant
at the 1% level. After controlling for other variables that
can explain follow-on fund performance, the coefficient
estimate on first fund alpha decreases by about a third
but is still statistically significant at the 1% level. We
obtain similar results when investigating alpha or
abnormal returns averaged over 24 months. When
abnormal returns are averaged over 36 months, the
coefficient estimates on FIRSTALPHA are signifi-
cantly weaker and not always statistically distin-
guishable from zero at the 5% level.
To investigate persistence in first fund performance,
we estimate the following regression:
FIRSTALPHAim,m+11  a + bFIRSTALPHAim−12,m−1
+ clog FIRSTSIZEim−1( )
+ dFIRSTMGTFEEi
+ eFIRSTPERFFEEi
+ fFIRSTNOTICEi
+∑
k
gkFIRSTSTYLEDUMki
+∑
y
hyYEARDUMym + εim, (5)
where m is the first follow-on fund inception month,
FIRSTSIZEim−1 is first fund size in millions of US$,
FIRSTMGTFEEi is first fund management fee in
percentage, FIRSTPERFFEEi is first fund performance
fee in percentage, FIRSTNOTICEi is first fund redemp-
tion notification period in months, FIRSTSTYLEDUMki
is first fund style dummy for style k, and YEARDUMym
is follow-on fund inception year dummy for year y.
We estimate the univariate version of the regression
as well as two other versions where fund abnormal
returns are averaged over 24 and 36 months instead
of over 12 months.
The coefficient estimates reported in columns (7)–(12)
of Table A2 indicate that first fund performance per-
sists around the launch of the first follow-on fund.
A one percentage point increase in first fund monthly
alpha in the 12-month period prior to follow-on fund
launch is associated with a 12.6 basis point increase in
first fund monthly alpha in the 12-month period after
the follow-on fund launch. The coefficient estimate is
statistically significant at the 1% level and prevails
after controlling for the other factors that explain first
fund performance. In addition, thefindings are robust
to extending the evaluation horizon to 24 or 36 months.
Therefore, firms with stellar first fund performance are
not simply lucky. Investors who subscribe to the first
and follow-on funds managed by such firms are ratio-
nally responding to the view that they employ talented
investment professionals.
3.7. Blowback Effect
Are there constraints on the amount of capital that
hedge fund firms can raise when adopting amultiple-
product growth strategy? We test for evidence of a
feedback or blowback effect from follow-on funds to
first funds by estimating the following regression on
first fund flow:
FIRSTFLOWim  a + bFIRSTALPHAim−12,m−1
+ cFIRSTFLOWim−12,m−1
+ dFIRSTVOLim−12,m−1
+ eFIRSTHWMi
+ fNFIRSTALPHAim−12,m−1
+ gNFIRSTFLOWim−12,m−1
+ hNFIRSTVOLim−12,m−1
+∑
k
lkFIRSTSTYLEDUMki
+∑
y
o yYEARDUMym + εim, (6)
where FIRSTFLOWim is flow into first fund i on
month m, FIRSTALPHAim−12,m−1 is first fund i ab-
normal return averaged over the previous 12 months,
FIRSTVOLim−12,m−1 is standard deviation of first fund i
abnormal return estimated over theprevious 12months,
FIRSTHWMi is first fund i high water-mark indicator,
NFIRSTALPHAim−12,m−1 is follow-on fund abnormal
return averaged over all follow-on fundsmanaged by
the firm that launched fund i and averaged over the
previous 12 months, NFIRSTFLOWim−12,m−1 is follow-
on fund flow averaged over all follow-on funds
managed by the firm that launched fund i and aver-
agedover theprevious 12months,NFIRSTVOLim−12,m−1
is standard deviation of average follow-on fund i
abnormal return estimated over theprevious 12months,
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FIRSTSTYLEDUMki is first fund i style dummy for
style k, and YEARDUMym is year dummy for year y.
Statistical inferences are based on White (1980) heter-
oskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at
the firm level. We also estimate regressions with
lookback periods of 24 and 36 months.
The results reported in Table 10 indicate that there
is a significant blowback effect from follow-on funds
to first funds. Poor follow-on past performance is a
reliable harbinger of lower flows into first funds. The
impact of follow-on fund alpha is statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% level when abnormal returns are
averaged over the last 12 or 24 months. Moreover, the
impact of follow-on fund alpha is economically sig-
nificant. For alpha evaluated over the last 12 months,
it is about 17.09% as large as the impact of first fund
alpha on first fund flow. These results suggest that
investors rationally impose constraints on the ability
of hedge fund firms to grow via the launch of multiple
products. Firms that embark on this strategywill need
to balance quantity with quality when launching
new funds.
3.8. Endogeneity
Does the endogeneity of a firm’s growth strategy
engender the underperformance of follow-on versus
first funds? Systematic differences may exist between
firms that conceive follow-on funds (multiple-product
firms) and those that do not (single-product firms).
These differences could impact both the propensity to
launch follow-on funds and the performance spread
between first and follow-on funds. The multivariate
regression methodology that we employ in Section 3.2
allows us to ameliorate concerns that observed differ-
ences between funds managed by single- and multiple-
product firms explain our results.
Still, the multivariate regressions leave open the
possibility that unobserved differences between funds
managed by single- and multiple-product firms might
simultaneously affect the decision to embark on a
multiple-product growth strategy and the first versus
follow-on fund performance spread. To address this
concern, we conduct an instrumental variables analy-
sis. The instrument that we use, that is, firm strategy
flow at founding, is motivated by the choice of Asker
Table 10. Regressions on First Fund Flow
Dependent variable
FLOW
12-month lookback period 24-month lookback period 36-month lookback period
Independent variable (1) (2) (3)
FIRSTALPHA 0.743** 0.807** 0.873**
(12.81) (9.72) (8.82)
FIRSTFLOW 0.263** 0.214** 0.171**
(20.02) (13.59) (9.25)
FIRSTVOL −0.077** −0.056 −0.044
(−2.66) (−1.62) (−1.17)
FIRSTHWM −0.007 0.070 0.0465
(−0.07) (0.62) (0.39)
NFIRSTALPHA 0.127** 0.170** 0.118
(2.89) (2.99) (1.91)
NFIRSTFLOW 0.028** 0.010 0.002
(3.91) (1.33) (0.23)
NFIRSTVOL 0.052 0.022 −0.001
(1.57) (0.58) (−0.03)
Strategy fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Calendar year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 0.024 0.014 0.010
Number of observations 114,079 108,863 99,930
Notes. Regressions are estimated on the flow of the first funds managed by each hedge fund firm. For each firm, we distinguish between the first
fund launched and other follow-on funds. The dependent variable is first fund monthly flow (FLOW). The independent variables include
FIRSTALPHA, FIRSTFLOW, FIRSTVOL, FIRSTHWM,NFIRSTALPHA,NFIRSTFLOW,NFIRSTVOL, where FIRSTALPHA is first fund abnormal
return averaged over the last x months, FIRSTFLOW is first fund flow averaged over the last xmonths, FIRSTVOL is the standard deviation of
first fund abnormal returns estimated over the last xmonths, FIRSTHWM is first fund high-water mark indicator,NFIRSTALPHA is the average
abnormal return of the follow-on funds within the same firm averaged over the last xmonths,NFIRSTFLOW is the average flow into the follow-
on funds within the same firm averaged over the last xmonths, and NFIRSTVOL is the standard deviation of follow-on fund abnormal returns
estimated over the last x months. The independent variable of interest is NFIRSTALPHA. The lookback period x equals either 12, 24, or
36 months. The regressions include controls for fund investment style and calendar year fixed effects. In parentheses are the t-statistics. They are
derived from robust standard errors that are clustered by firm. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013.
*Significant at the 5% level; **significant at the 1% level.
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et al. (2015) of venture capital supply at founding to
instrument for firm listing status. Firm strategy flow
at founding is the strategyflowof thefirst fund conceived
by the firm in the one-year period prior to firm in-
ception.23 We argue that the ability to attract capital at
inception allows a first fund to grow quickly and sets
the stage for the launch of follow-on funds later.
The first-stage results in column (1) of Table A.3 in the
online appendix confirm this prediction. The supply
of capital around the time of firm founding is a neg-
ative and significant predictor of a firm’s single-
product status, proxied by FIRST, with an F-statistic
of 20.52.24
In columns (2) and (3) of Table A.3, we report the
second stage results for the fund return and alpha
equations, respectively. After instrumenting for first
fund status or FIRST with firm strategy flow at in-
ception, first funds continue to outperform follow-
on funds. The results reported in columns (4)–(6) of
Table A.3 indicate that the fund launch chronology
results are also robust to adjusting for endogeneity.
4. Robustness Tests
In this section,we present amedley of robustness tests
to ascertain the strength of our empirical results.
4.1. Backfill Bias
First funds may backfill their returns more than do
follow-on funds. In response to such concerns, we con-
fine the analysis to TASS and HFR funds for which we
have the date that the fund listed on the databases (only
available in TASS and HFR). Next, we redo the baseline
Table 4 portfolio sort for those returns at or after the
respective fund listing date. As shown in panel A of
Table 11, our results are robust to controlling for
backfill bias in this fashion. Inferences also remain
unchanged when, as an alternative, we remove the
first 24 months of returns for all funds to adjust for
backfill and incubation bias.
4.2. Serial Correlation
Serial correlation in fund returns could arise from linear
interpolation of prices for infrequently traded securities,
the use of smoothed broker dealer quotes, or deliberate
performance-smoothing behavior. This could inflate
some of the test statistics that we use tomake inferences.
To allay such concerns,weunsmooth fund returns using
the algorithm of Getmansky et al. (2004) and redo
the Table 4 portfolio sort. The results reported in
panel B of Table 11 indicate that the findings are not
driven by serial correlation. We also redo the Table 5
regressions with fund returns adjusted for serial
correlation. The coefficient estimates reported inpanelA
of Table A.4 in the online appendix indicate that the
findings are also not by-products of serial correlation.
4.3. Prefee Returns
Hedge fund returns are reported net of fees. If first
funds charge lower fees than do follow-on funds, this
may explain the outperformance of the former. To
check, we back out prefee fund returns. As shown in
panel C of Table 11, the baseline portfolio sort spreads
are even greater when we analyze prefee fund returns.
4.4. Dynamic Risk Exposures
One concern is that the beta loadings of the fund
portfolios might not stay constant over time. As a
result, the risk-adjustment for the baseline portfolio
sort might not be accurate. To account for dynamic
factor loadings, we calculate the factor loadings using
a rolling 36-month window and use those factor
loadings to calculate abnormal returns one month
forward. The results, presented in panel D of Table 11,
indicate that our findings are robust to catering for
dynamic risk exposures.
4.5. Additional Risk Factors
Relative to follow-on funds, first funds could be loading
upmore on someomitted risk factor that didwell over the
sample period. Hence, we augment the Fung and Hsieh
(2004) modelwith (i) an emergingmarkets factor derived
from the MSCI Emerging Markets Index return, (ii) the
out-of-the-money (henceforth OTM) S&P 500 call and
put option-based factors from the Agarwal and Naik
(2004) model, and (iii) the Pástor and Stambaugh
(2003) liquidity factor, and redo the Table 4 portfo-
lio sort. The results presented in panels E–G of Table 11
indicate that our baseline findings are not driven by
the presence of omitted risk factors.25
4.6. Fund Termination
There are concerns that, because funds that drop out
from the database could have terminated their op-
erations, the portfolio alphas are biased upward.
Edelman et al. (2013) find that returns of funds after
they dropped out of the databases do not differ
materially from returns of funds that remain in the
databases. Nonetheless, to allay such concerns, we
assume that, for the month after a fund drops out of
the database, its return is –10%. Thereafter, money is
reallocated to the remaining funds in the portfolio. As
shown in panel H of Table 11, the results are robust
to this adjustment. We also experiment with more
extreme termination returns of –20% and –30% and
obtain qualitatively similar results.
4.7. Subsample Analysis
To understand how the outperformance of first funds
varies over time, we split the sample period into two
subperiods: January 1994 toDecember 2003 and January
2004 to December 2013. Next, we redo the Table 4
portfolio sort for each subperiod. The results in panels I
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and JofTable 11 indicate that our findings are stronger
in the first subperiod than in the second subperiod.
Nonetheless, the alpha of the spread between port-
folios A and D is still economically and statistically
significant for the second subperiod.
4.8. Duplicate Share Classes
In our analysis, we exclude duplicate share classes.
One concern is that including duplicate share classes
may materially affect the results. To test, we redo the
baseline portfolio sort and fund performance re-
gressions after including duplicate share classes. The
results reported in panel K of Table 11 and panel B of
Table A.4 in the online appendix indicate that the
findings are qualitatively unchanged when we in-
clude duplicate share classes.
4.9. Firm Fixed Effects
The results from the regressions on fund performance
in Table 5 may be driven by performance differences
between funds in single-product firms and follow-on
funds in multiple-product firms, and between first
and follow-on funds in multiple-product firms. To
ascertain that they are not driven purely by the for-
mer, we include firm fixed effects and redo the
baseline regressions. The results presented in panel C
of Table A.4 in the online appendix suggest that the
findings in Table 5 are at least partly driven by per-
formance differences between first and follow-on
funds from multiple-product firms.
4.10. Firm Size
Firm size may drive the underperformance of follow-
on funds. To test, we include the logarithm of last
month’s firm AUM as an additional independent
variable and re-estimate the baseline fund perfor-
mance regressions. The results, reported in panel D of
Table A.4 in the online appendix, are largely robust to
controlling for firm size.
5. Conclusion
The empirical results in this paper enrich our un-
derstanding of capital accumulation in the hedge
fund industry. We show that there exist spillover
effects from first to follow-on funds launched by
hedge fund firms. Stellar first fund performance al-
lows hedge fund firms to raise follow-on funds that
charge higher fees, set more onerous redemption
terms, and attract more capital. The spillover effects
in turn lead hedge fund firms to focus more on the
performance of their first funds. Consequently, first
funds outperform follow-on funds after adjusting for
risk. In line with an agency explanation, the perfor-
mance spread between first and follow-on funds is
strongest for funds with poor incentive alignment,
that is, funds that charge low performance fees
relative to management fees, feature no manager
coinvestment, operate far below their high water
marks, and attract flows that are insensitive to per-
formance. Also consistent with the agency view, the
strategy of leveraging on successful first fund per-
formance to launch multiple follow-on funds hurts
investors but benefits fundmanagers.Multiple-product
firms underperform single-product firms while har-
vesting greater fee revenues. Investors respond to this
growth strategy by redeeming from first funds when
follow-on funds underperform. Therefore, firms cannot
completely forsake qualitywhen embarking on amultiple-
product growth strategy that emphasizes quantity.
Ironically, although growing the hedge fund franchise
by launching multiple products hurts performance ex-
post, the prospect of generating substantial fee revenues
through a multiple-product hedge fund firm may well
incentivize outperformance ex-ante. Nevertheless, the
findings in this paper suggest that judicious investors
should focus on the first funds launched by hedge fund
firms when allocating capital and eschew firms that
launch multiple follow-on funds.26
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Endnotes
1 See Pozen and Clay (2012, p. 6).
2 See https://www.barclayhedge.com/research/indices/ghs/mum/
HF_Money_Under_Management.html, accessed November 8, 2019.
3 See “Hedge funds must grapple with shifting balance of power,”
Financial Times, August 25, 2015, for a discussion on the institu-
tionalization of the hedge fund industry.
4According to TroyGayeski, partner at SkyBridge, aNewYork-based
fund of funds, “Ten years ago a hedge fundwith $50m of assets could
generate plenty of revenue to cover overheads. These days it has to be
$500m, and part of the reason is that regulatory requirements have
gone up dramatically.” See “Hedge funds move to family offices is
not entirely popular,” Financial Times, October 23, 2015. For a dis-
cussion on fees see “Hedge funds cut fees to stem client exodus,”
Financial Times, December 18, 2015, and “Calpers to pare external
managers,” Wall Street Journal, June 8, 2015.
5For example, the Financial Times reported that Man Group’s stock
rose buoyed by the outperformance of its first fund, AHL. See “Man
Group outperforms as first fund sparkles,” Financial Times,
Fung et al.: Hedge Fund Franchises
26 Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–28, © 2020 The Author(s)
September 24, 2011. Similarly, the Wall Street Journal reported
that BlueCrest plans to stop managing money for outside clients
after a run of poor returns and client redemptions from its first
fund, BlueCrest Capital International. See “BlueCrest capital
decides to go private,” Wall Street Journal, December 2, 2015.
6 In the paper, we principally label as multiple-product firms, those
with multiple funds. That said, our results prevail when we define as
multiple-product firms, those with multiple distinct strategies. Spe-
cifically, firms with uncorrelated strategies underperform those
with one strategy (or correlated strategies), but harvest greater fee
revenues.
7Unlike Aggarwal and Jorion (2010), who analyze the impact of time
since fund launch on performance, we investigate the association
between the launch order of funds within firms and performance.
8 Jorion and Schwarz (2014) argue that the discontinuity at zero in the
hedge fund net return distribution documented by Bollen and Pool
(2009) is not evidence of manager manipulation.
9The results are robust to using pre-fee returns.
10 If a hedge fund firm has an onshore and offshore fund pair, we drop
the offshore fund, essentially treating it like a duplicate share class.
We also find that our baseline results do not change if we drop the
onshore fund in those cases. Our findings are therefore not driven by
differences between the onshore and offshore duplicate of the same
fund (Aragon et al. 2014).
11Of the 6,882 firms in our sample, 6,387 have a single first component
fund, while only 495 have multiple first component funds. In other
words, 93% of the firms in our sample startedwith only one fund. The
average number of first component funds per firm is 1.087. In lieu of
forming composite first funds, we cater for the possibility that firms
may launchmore than one fund in their first month in two alternative
ways. First, we drop firms that have more than one first fund, that is,
firms that launched more than one fund during their first month.
Second, for such firms, we consider the largest fund launched during
the first month as the first fund (based on fund AUM for the launch
month) and remove the other smaller fund or funds conceived during
that month. Our baseline results remain qualitatively unchanged
with these adjustments.
12The trend following factors can be downloaded from http://
faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/%7Edah7/DataLibrary/TF-Fac.xls.
13The results remain qualitatively unchanged when alpha is esti-
mated for all funds with at least 36 months of return data.
14 In results available upon request, we also find that first fund
performance is positively associated to the total number of follow-on
funds conceived several years later. For example, when we sort firms
into quintiles based on first fund returns averaged over the first three
years postinception, we find that the cumulative number of follow-on
funds launched up to five years later for firms in the highest per-
formance quintile is significantly greater than that for firms in the
lowest performance quintile.
15 Inferences do not change when we estimate regressions on raw
fund returns instead of alphas. Note that we windsorize fund returns
and flows at the 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles to ameliorate the effects of
outliers.
16Our management fee results are broadly consistent with those of
Ramadorai and Streatfield (2012). While we find that successful first
funds do not allow follow-on funds to charge higher management
fees, we also find that superior follow-on funds allow subsequent
follow-on funds to charge higher management fees. Therefore, like
Ramadorai and Streatfield (2012), we do find that superior firm
performance precedes higher management fees. In unreported re-
sults, by estimating regressions on follow-on fund management fee
with past firm performance as the independent variable, we verify
that this is indeed the case.
17 In results available upon request, we find no evidence of spillover
effects on the fees, notice periods, and flows of the subsequent funds,
when we analyze the third funds, that is, the second follow-on funds,
launched by hedge fund firms.
18We also estimate the same set of regressions as in Table 5 but with
both FIRST and CHRONO as independent variables, together with
the same set of controls. The results are largely robust to the inclusion
of both independent variables in the regression. The coefficient es-
timates on FIRST are positive and statistically significant at the 1%
level across all regression specifications. Those on CHRONO are all
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, save for that in
the Fama-MacBeth regression on fund returns, in which it is negative
and statistically significant at the 10% level. These results are available
upon request and suggest that successive fund performance con-
tinues to deteriorate even after the launch of the first follow-on fund.
19The Fama-MacBeth regressions for the subsets of funds with and
without personal capital reported in Table 6 do not feature strategy
fixed effects as, within each group, there exist months for which there
are no funds in some strategies.
20 Inferences do not change when we exclude FIRST as an inde-
pendent variable in the Table 7 regressions.
21We obtain similar inferences when we sort based on the average
pairwise correlation of the strategies of the fundsmanaged by thefirm.
22The results reported in panel L of Table 9 suggest that first funds in
group IV are able to grow their fee revenues more than do first funds
in group III. Specifically, based on the fees reported in the first row of
the above-mentioned panel, first funds in the different strategy group
(i.e., group IV) grow their fee revenues by US$ (10.09 − 8.22 − (6.20 −
5.35)) million or US$1.02 million per annum (t-statistic = 7.16) more
than do first funds in the identical strategy group (i.e., group III). We
also conduct the analogous analysis for firm fee revenues as opposed
to first fund fee revenues. We find that firms in the different strategy
group grow their fee revenues by US$0.83 million per annum
(t-statistic = 2.20) more than do firms in the identical strategy group.
23 Specifically, Asker et al. (2015) use as their instrument the total
number of firms receiving first-round venture capital funding in a
firm’s headquarter state two years after a firm was funded. We use
firm strategy flow in the one-year period before firm inception as an
instrument since we seek to explain fund launch chronology status for
all periods after firm inception. We obtain similar inferences when we
use firm strategy flow during the two-year period before inception.
24For single-fund firms, FIRST is always equal to one. For multiple-
fund firms, the probability that FIRST equals one in any month is a
decreasing function of the number of follow-on funds launched by
the firm that report returns that month.
25 Inferences do not change when we augment the Fung and Hsieh
model with the emerging markets factor, the out-of-the-money call
and put option-based factors, and the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003)
liquidity factor, and use the resultant 11-factormodel to adjust for risk
exposure in our portfolio sorts.
26Whether a firm is single- or multiple-product is determined at each
point in time. Therefore, the challenge for investors who subscribe to
funds managed by single-product firms is that they may not remain
single-product once they deliver superior investment performance.
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